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In his March 2009 testimony, Gregory Nojeim warned Congress of the potential danger 
to civil liberties posed by the government’s suspicious activity report (SAR) program.  
But Nojeim, director of the Project on Freedom, Security, & Technology, raised another 
concern – that “the security ‘bang per byte’ of information gathered may be diminishing. 
While ‘stove piping’ was yesterday’s problem, tomorrow’s problem may be ‘pipe 
clogging,’ as huge amounts of information are being gathered without apparent focus.”1 
In concluding his testimony, Nojeim recommends: 
The Subcommittee should test whether SAR reporting is both effective and 
efficient in preventing terrorism…. SAR reporting may or may not be the best way 
to collect the ‘dots’ that need to be connected to head off terrorist attacks; 
whether it is or is not should be tested.  Because the SAR reporting system will 
result in the collection of so much information about innocent activities, it seems 
that it would be good to know at the front end that the results are likely to be 
worth the risks.2  
A subsequent CRS study, in November 2009, endorsed Nojeim’s suggestion questioning 
the need for a data-intensive program and made a similar recommendation: “Congress 
may be interested in how a future SAR Program Management Office intends to address 
this problem – specifically, which agency or agencies will be responsible for quality 
control of SARs [sic] to prevent system overload from irrelevant or redundant ones.”3 
This article acknowledges the progress made in protecting civil rights – an area of 
legitimate concern – but rejects categorically the call to reduce or limit the size of the 
SAR program. Two analytic requirements for the collection of more rather than less 
information through the SAR process are presented, to increase the probability of 
identifying pre-operational terrorist activity and to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of critical infrastructure protection regimes. In statistical analysis, more is 
better. 
The SAR Program and Process 
Since 2007, the U.S. homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence communities 
have formally recognized the usefulness of SAR in counterterrorism. The U.S. 
government defines a SAR as “official documentation of observed behavior that may be 
indicative of intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning related to terrorism, 
criminal, or other illicit intention.”4 The primary impetus for the federal government’s 
National SAR Initiative (NSI) is intelligence support to law enforcement, although 
officials from the critical infrastructure (CI) protection world have recognized that SAR 
can help them improve their performance. 
Law enforcement has been collecting SAR (or something similar, such as field 
interviews of suspicious individuals) for decades. The NSI program endeavors to 
formalize a nationwide, uniform process for evaluating and recording this information 
and then making it available to appropriate personnel and organizations through the 
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Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The SAR concept and the NSI were both 
originally developed to provide direct support to law enforcement. Here is the typical 
process in brief: law enforcement intelligence analysts receive and evaluate all new SAR. 
In those relatively rare cases where a single SAR is both credible and actionable, the 
information is embedded in a short analytic report and provided directly to law 
enforcement for immediate counterterrorism action. These leads go to the local Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has first right of refusal in terrorism cases. If the 
JTTF chooses not to follow-up, the lead is passed to state or local police for action. The 
figure below illustrates the Notional SAR Process in detail.5  
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This graphic has a familiar feel since it shows the traditional intelligence cycle as applied 
to suspicious activity reports. It begins with collection (information acquisition), 
moves to the (organizational) processing of that information, then on to analysis 
(integration/consolidation) and ends with final dissemination (and data retrieval) of 
the SAR and SAR-based analysis to the law enforcement customer (JTTF). Although not 
shown clearly, the cycle is completed through the “feedback to the collector” function 
in the last column of the graphic.   
SAR originate from a wide variety of sources, including law enforcement officers, 
public and private sector security, and the public through “phone in” calls to hotlines, 
and are reported to a large number of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law 
enforcement organizations. From an intelligence perspective, the lack of direct control 
over some of these intelligence sources results in exceptional difficulty in assessing the 
quality of SAR. The NSI/ISE leadership is acutely aware of this problem as highlighted 
in the original “Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative Concept of 
Operations”: 
A standard reporting format is a key element of the effective implementation of a 
SAR program. A standardized report provides a mechanism for the efficient 
transition of the suspicious activity from the line-level officer to the agency 
management. This process will ensure that the suspicious activity is being 
collected and reported correctly and will regulate the reporting procedures across 
the agency.  
Additionally, in order to identify local, regional, and national trends in crime 
and terrorist precursor activity, a common national set of data collection codes 
needs to be adopted to ensure seamless sharing and analysis of suspicious 
activity. This national standard of codes will ensure that patterns of criminal 
behavior are identified and handled properly. The establishment of these codes 
needs to be the result of evaluation and determination that the activities to be 
collected are likely precursors of terrorist activity.”6  
If anything, this focus on SAR quality (a necessary condition for using SAR in the 
analytic process) has increased as seen in the extensive treatment dedicated in the 
“Final Report: Information Sharing Environment – Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Evaluation Environment.”7  
Legitimate Civil Rights Concerns 
Coming from a civil liberties perspective, Nojeim is most concerned about the range and 
number of collectors and the fact that despite a plethora of “quidelines” for collecting, 
handling, and storing SAR, the collection guidelines “fail to provide adequate guidance” 
(emphasis added).8 This legitimate issue raised by Nojeim was directly addressed by the 
NSI/SAR leadership in developing their January 2010 report on the NSI-SAR 
Evaluation Environment. In fact, no less an organization than the ACLU has provided 
kudos to the NSI SAR leadership, its efforts, and its results: 
The ACLU released a report criticizing these SAR programs in July 2008. In 
response, ISE program manager Thomas E. McNamara and his office worked 
with the ACLU and other privacy and civil liberties groups, as well as the LAPD 
and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, to revise the ISE SAR 
functional standard to address privacy and civil liberties concerns.  
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The revised ISE guidelines for suspicious activity reporting, issued in May 
2009, establish that a reasonable connection to terrorism or other criminal 
activity is required before law enforcement officers may collect Americans’ 
personal information and share it within the ISE…. The revised ISE functional 
standards also make clear that behaviors such as photography and eliciting 
information are protected under the First Amendment, and require additional 
facts and circumstances giving reason to believe the behavior is related to crime 
or terrorism before reporting is appropriate. These changes to the standard, 
which include reiterating that race, ethnicity and religion cannot be used as 
factors that create suspicion, give law enforcement all the authority it needs while 
showing greater respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. We applaud 
the willingness of the ISE Program Manager to engage constructively with the 
civil liberties community and to make significant modifications to the functional 
standard to address the concerns presented (emphasis added).9   
So far, so good. The civil liberties community and the SAR leadership agree that privacy 
issues are being addressed through guidance on how to handle such information. 
Criticism Beyond Civil Liberties 
Unfortunately the ACLU also picked up and repeated Nojeim’s concern over the sheer 
volume of SAR, implying that a smaller program would be better in terms of program 
efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, these civil rights advocates and 
organizations are now evaluating the analytic merits of intelligence officers having more 
or less data available to do their job, a subject well beyond their civil liberties expertise. 
Specifically, the ACLU continues: 
This overbroad reporting mandate is not just constitutionally questionable; it’s 
also counterproductive. These orders, if taken seriously by local law 
enforcement, can yield only one outcome: an ocean of data about innocent 
individuals that will overwhelm the investigative resources of the authorities 
(emphasis added).10 
In fact, this final conclusion is both naïve and incorrect. Intelligence analysts actually 
need an “ocean of data” concerning suspicious activity (but NOT the personal identities 
of those engaging in such activity) to successfully apply sophisticated statistical analysis 
techniques that have the potential to discern between benign activity and true terrorist 
precursor activity, thereby reducing the investigative load. Similarly, analysis of 
comprehensive data on suspicious but benign behavior near critical infrastructure is the 
first step in developing security programs to protect that infrastructure. 
Why Analysts Need a Massive SAR Database 
Figure 2 lays out a simplified representation of intelligence-led SAR support to law 
enforcement. As shown by the two arrows leading to law enforcement actions, there are 
two ways SAR-based intelligence reaches police authorities. The direct approach was 
discussed above and is straightforward. In the rare cases where a SAR is a clear 
indicator of threat, the SAR information moves quickly and directly from the 
intelligence realm to law enforcement for investigation.  
The “indirect” method is fundamentally distinct from the direct method. In the 
indirect case, each new SAR is processed and evaluated by both intelligence and critical 
infrastructure analysts to determine whether there are non-obvious reasons for law 
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enforcement follow-up. To accomplish this task, the analysts must determine whether 
the new SAR is an anomaly when compared to the results of “pattern analysis models.” 
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Here is a brief summary of how such models and their results are generated. First, 
intelligence analysts format and evaluate all new SAR (a major task as noted above) and 
add them to the “complete historical SAR database.” This database is then used with a 
similar (in that both are geo-rectified) database that holds information on critical 
infrastructure (CI) to feed the pattern analysis models, which, in turn, yield the “Normal 
Pattern of SAR” for each element of the CI. Critical Infrastructure analysts are 
responsible for generating the CI Database, which contains GIS and other information 
on each facility.  Now for a closer look. 
The Theoretical Foundation of the Indirect Approach 
Given the obvious problems with using SAR as “intelligence,” a number of professional 
intelligence officers have resisted spending scarce resources collecting and analyzing 
them. In the foreign intelligence world, a significant premium is placed on recruiting 
well-placed, reliable sources that can report raw intelligence that addresses specific 
collection requirements. Obviously, there is an effort by domestic law enforcement to 
utilize similar human sources (confidential informants) and technical collection (court 
approved wiretaps) to collect high-grade information. In the foreign arena, our 
intelligence agencies have been successful in collecting significant information on 
terrorist groups, their numbers, leaders, tactics, and techniques. This reporting has been 
used extensively in preparing analyses (target studies) at both the tactical and strategic 
levels. But within the U.S. domestic theatre, there just have not been many specific, 
credible reports on planned terrorist attacks within the U.S. since the 9/11 attacks.  
Although few in numbers, specific, credible intelligence reports have been critical in 
preventing terrorist attacks and both intelligence and law enforcement are actively 
seeking to acquire more such information. 
On the other hand, there have been tens (possibly hundreds) of thousands of 
domestic suspicious activity reports collected in the U.S. by state and local law 
enforcement since 9/11. Statistically, the probability of any single SAR being an 
indicator of an actual terrorist plot is so small that it is insignificant. But the greater the 
number of SAR, the greater the overall probability that at least a few real indicators of 
threat exist within the total body of SAR reporting.   
Most domestic intelligence practitioners characterize the counter-terrorism problem 
as separating the signal (the very rare true indicator of a terrorist threat) from the noise 
(the huge number of meaningless or benign SAR). For example, in 2009-2010 the FBI 
reports that of the 3,400 SAR entered into its system,11 only fifty-six of these (less than 2 
percent) merited an actual investigation.12  
The indirect approach for using SAR to identify true threats harnesses the power of 
statistics and analysis to solve the signal/noise problem. Here is an example of the 
technique. Let’s say there are 100 widget factories in the country and that we think 
(based on credible, specific intelligence regarding terrorist intent) that there is a near-
term plot to attack one such factory. The challenge is to identify which particular widget 
factory is being targeted. Our understanding of how terrorists plan an attack tells us that 
operatives are likely to conduct at least a few surveillance operations before an attack.  
Further, we have collected a large number of SAR at or near the 100 widget factories 
over the past nine years – let’s say 90,000 – roughly 100 SAR per plant per year.  
Obviously, if we are very lucky we will be able to identify the four or five of these 90,000 
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SAR that are true terrorist surveillance and immediately notify law enforcement and 
critical infrastructure protection to take appropriate actions. 
But the likelihood of being so fortunate in identifying the actual SAR that are strong 
indicators of the targeted factory by examining each of the 90,000 relevant SAR is 
remote. 
We have a much better chance of identifying a real indication of a threat if we 
characterize the challenge as defining the “normal” laydown of SAR at a widget factory 
with enough specificity to enable us to recognize a situation or SAR that is not normal.  
For example, if we can use our complete data set of SAR to develop a reliable expected 
pattern of SAR on any given target or area, then a significant deviation from that pattern 
is by definition an anomaly that deserves further investigation.   
This approach is grounded in the “Law of Large Numbers.” 
In probability theory, the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) is a theorem that describes 
the result of performing the same experiment a large number of times. According to the 
law, the average of the results obtained from a large number of trials should be close to 
the expected value, and will tend to become closer as more trials are performed. 
For our widget factory, here is how the LLN might work in action. We take the full 
dataset of 90,000 SAR on widget factories and if this total number of SAR is large 
enough and if every facility is collecting and reporting SAR in a uniform and consistent 
fashion, then we should be able to develop a model which will tell us if there are an 
unusually large number or type of SAR at any given widget plant. We can do this 
because quantitative methodologists, working with intelligence and critical 
infrastructure analysts, can now construct a model that defines the normal pattern of 
SAR for each unique widget plant. This model actually forecasts the number and 
characteristics of SAR expected at each widget plant during a particular time period and 
a statistically significant deviation from this expected value would constitute an 
indicator of unusual (and possibly terrorist) activity. Obviously, from the LLN we know 
that the larger our complete database of SAR, the more reliable our “expected value.”  
Note that intelligence analysts do not require any personal information on those 
conducting the suspicious activity to conduct their analysis. 
While theoretically feasible, the practical problems involved in constructing and 
maintaining a SAR database in which there is consistency and uniform treatment of the 
collection and coding of the data (SAR) might well be impossible to overcome, at least in 
the near term. For example, the data set on SAR must be huge, relatively consistent, and 
comprehensive to enable robust analysis.  One need only consider the fact that there are 
over 18,000 local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations within the U.S. 
collecting and reporting SAR to begin to understand and to size the obstacles to full and 
effective implementation. On the other hand, the cost of overcoming these difficulties 
and uncertainties must be counterbalanced against the potential payoff of preventing a 
successful terrorist attack, either by direct law enforcement action or through improved 
critical infrastructure (CI) protection. 
SAR Support to Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection 
The second argument for a robust SAR program is its largely unrecognized role in CI 
protection.  The DHS website states: 
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CI (Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources) is an umbrella term referring to the 
assets of the United States essential to the nation's security, public health and 
safety, economic vitality, and way of life. CI is divided into 18 separate sectors, as 
diverse as agriculture and food, emergency services, and cyber networks. [See 
below.] 
Because this critical infrastructure provides our country with the enormous 
benefits, services and opportunities on which we rely, we (DHS) are very mindful 
of the risks posed to CI by terrorists, pandemic diseases and natural disasters. At 
the Department of Homeland Security, we know that these threats can have 
serious effects, such as cutting populations off from clean water, power, 
transportation, or emergency supplies. 
Secretary Napolitano is working to raise awareness about the importance of 
our nation's critical infrastructure, and strengthen our ability to protect it 
[emphasis added]. The Department oversees programs and resources that foster 
public-private partnerships, enhance protective programs, and build national 
resiliency to withstand natural disasters and terrorist threats.13  
 
 
The 18 DHS Defined Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
Agriculture & Food Emergency Services 
Banking & Finance Energy 
Chemical Government Facilities 
Commercial Facilities Information Technology 
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste National Monuments & Icons 
Critical Manufacturing Postal & Shipping 
Dams Telecommunications 
Defense Industrial Base Public Health & Healthcare 
Drinking Water & Water Treatment Facilities Transportation Systems 
Figure	  3.	  DHS	  Defined	  Critical	  Infrastructure	  Sectors	   	  
 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) sets forth a comprehensive risk 
analysis and management framework and clearly defines critical infrastructure 
protection roles and responsibilities for DHS and other federal, state, local, tribal, and 
private sector CI partners. The NIPP provides the coordinated approach used to 
establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for infrastructure protection to 
ensure that funding and resources are applied effectively. The goal of the NIPP is to 
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build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the 
nation’s CI to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by 
terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national 
preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural 
disaster, or other emergency.14  
Just as in the intelligence support to law enforcement case, intelligence support to CI 
protection goes well beyond SAR-based information. National, homeland security, and 
law enforcement intelligence organizations all produce and disseminate reports on 
terrorist techniques, historical terrorist targets and tactics, and many other studies to 
help those responsible for protecting CI. In fact, such studies are used to develop and 
validate sets of indicators of pre-operational activity. But SAR-based intelligence also 
has an important role to play.   
The central player in bringing intelligence to bear on CI protection at the national 
level is the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) 
which conducts integrated threat and risk analyses for CI sectors. HITRAC is a joint 
fusion center that spans both the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) – a member 
of the Intelligence Community – and Infrastructure Protection. As called for in section 
201 of the Homeland Security Act, HITRAC brings together intelligence and 
infrastructure specialists to ensure a sufficient understanding of the risks to the nation’s 
CI from foreign and domestic threats.15  
HITRAC, partnering with the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
(NISAC), has the mandate to lead in the development, testing, and evaluation of SAR-
based models of “normal patterns” of SAR at CI. As noted above, HITRAC is unique in 
bringing together intelligence and critical infrastructure analysts at the national level. It 
also has been aggressive in working with state-level CI protection organizations and 
fusion centers to develop intelligence support to CI protection. On the other hand, 
NISAC has the sophisticated expertise needed to conduct statistical modeling. In fact, 
NISAC is a congressionally-mandated modeling, simulation, and analysis program.16 
The Center already prepares and shares analyses of CI including their 
interdependencies, consequences, and other complexities, so moving on to model the 
relationship between SAR and CI is a natural extension.  
We can now move on to Figure 4, which displays the role of intelligence based on SAR 
in improving CI protection. Intelligence analysts are responsible for developing, 
updating, and improving the “complete historical SAR database.” Similarly, critical 
infrastructure analysts are responsible for bringing their sector-specific expertise to bear 
in developing and maintaining a GIS-rectified CI database. These two teams of analysts, 
working in tandem, operate the models that yield a picture of the “normal pattern of 
SARs [sic] to specific CI facilities”. This understanding of what constitutes a normal 
versus an abnormal situation at sector specific potential targets can then be used by the 
CI analysts to develop a more effective protection regime at that facility. Finally, in the 
process of advising CI stakeholders and partners, the CI analysts will encourage them to 
gather more and better reports of suspicious activity – a positive feedback loop 
strengthening the SAR process. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
This paper has presented two SAR-based, data-intensive analytic techniques that have 
the theoretic potential to improve our counter-terrorism efforts by warning of terrorism 
activity and by assisting in the development of better CI protection regimes.  Civil liberty 
activists point out the potential dangers to our privacy posed by a massive, national SAR 
program. They also question the effectiveness and efficiency of such a SAR effort. 
Before national policymakers decide which way to go on this issue, it seems 
reasonable to conduct a validation test to determine whether or not the theoretic value-
added of a robust SAR program can be proven in the real world. Such a validation 
program would begin with selection of a representative sample of the most important 
target sets (i.e. mass transit systems, bridges, dams, etc) and a concerted effort to collect 
a comprehensive data set of “suspicious activity” for this sample. Analysts from both the 
critical infrastructure and intelligence disciplines, supported by quantitative 
methodologists, would then be tasked to develop models of “normal” suspicious activity 
for each sample facility. If the models simply are not sensitive enough to detect 
simulated precursor terrorist activity or to provide insights into ways to improve 
protection of these facilities, then it is reasonable to constrain the SAR program. But if 
the models can do the job and actually are shown to constitute a unique, intelligence-
driven capability to prevent terrorist attacks or at least to better protect our critical 
infrastructure, then further debate is in order before we simply discard that capability.  
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